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INTRODUCTION

Property rights in information have long been taken for granted
in this country and in most of the developed world, for that matter.
The common sense premise behind America's intellectual property
regime is that the value to society of many types of information
frequently exceeds its developmental costs, therefore rendering it
socially desirable to encourage and produce such information.'
The rationale runs that in the absence of copyright or patent protection covering an individual's or firm's information creation, the
low cost of copying such works will induce competitors to enter
and "steal" another's product without penalty. Hence, rivals may
profit from another's intellectual efforts without expending any energy or costs other than the relatively minor costs required to duplicate the socially valuable creation.2
In turn, the incentives of "original" creators to generate beneficial informational works will be greatly diminished, if not entirely
eliminated. They will not be able to reap pecuniary rewards for
their efforts or even recover their costs in many cases because of
competitors copying their works and undercutting their prices.
Given that innovators will have little hope of recovering their investment, the production of information will be seriously curtailed,
1. This Article's analysis focuses on how society might best foster both production
and dissemination of such information, concentrating on information of repeat value, i.e.
information that enables the production of many units of a particular work.
2. For instance, books and other works of authorship that currently enjoy copyright
protection could simply be photocopied or reproduced by any rival publisher, allowing it
to capitalize on the intellectual fruits 6f another. Furthermore, with respect to patentable
inventions (life saving drugs for example), often the innovator will expend hundreds of
millions of dollars on research and development before a commercially viable product
can be developed and marketed. If, after this effort has been expended, anyone else may
duplicate the competitor's formula and undercut his price, few firms would find the initial
research and development investment worthwhile.
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and its associated benefits upon society will be lost. It is not difficult to envision the undesirability of this outcome.
The solution in the United States and in most developed nations is an intellectual property rights regime, here composed primarily of copyright and patent law, but also encompassing trademark and trade secret protection.' By assigning exclusive rights
over the use and distribution of informational works to their creators for a specified duration, individuals and firms can safely anticipate the potential rewards for their inventive endeavors. Thus,
they will be led to engage in substantially more information generation activity than their private calculus would indicate that they
should in a regime lacking legal protection. The fundamental principle is to bring the private incentives to develop socially useful information in line with the social incentives, an intuitive goal that
barely anyone would question. Simply put, we want information
to be created when its development cost is less than its social
value, and intellectual property rights aim to serve that purpose.
However, what is often ignored by those who tout the virtues
of America's incentive system are its costs. The desirability of
awarding property rights in information depends upon whether
their advantage of encouraging the generation of information outweighs their costs in terms of the restrictions placed upon the
availability of that information. When the law gives a creator a
copyright or patent over her work, in effect a temporary monopoly
over that piece of information is awarded. With monopoly rights
come monopoly prices. As such, there is the very real possibility
that many individuals who value the good at greater than its marginal cost of production, so that it would be socially desirable for
them to have it, will be unable to obtain it if their valuation is below the monopoly price.4 The corresponding social loss may potentially be quite significant, especially in instances where the
3. Attention will be focused primarily on copyright and patent, as this Article's purpose is not to examine in detail all aspects of American intellectual property protection,
but rather to explore the general notions underlying property rights in the hopes of offering a better alternative, i.e. a government-run reward system.
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 301-03 (Aspen Law
& Business, 5th ed., 1988). This phenomenon leads to the creation of "deadweight loss"
in a monopoly setting. See Appendix, infra p. 353 for an illustrative diagram and discussion.
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spread between marginal cost and monopoly price charged is
rather large, for example in the pharmaceutical and software industries.5
Even more disregarded by society than the costs of property
rights is the fact that some informational works would continue to
be produced in the absence of intellectual property protection,6
bringing into question the general justifications given for copyright
and patent protection in the first place. Besides the economicbased rationales, scholars such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, John
Locke, and Henry Sidgwick have proposed that an author's natural
right, personality, and added labor entitle her to a property right in
the fruits of her efforts independent of their social utility.7 I will
address these assertions, and ask whether such justifications for
intellectual property rights are sound.
Next, I address the issue of whether alternative incentives exist
to generate information in the absence of legal protection. Copyright and patent scholars such as Lloyd Weinreb of Harvard Law
School have urged that other inducements exist, including simple
personal satisfaction,' the quest for respect and esteem, 9 and the
power of convention." In addition, economists Scherer, Hurt and
Schuchman, as well as Justice Breyer and Professor Steven Shavell, have analyzed whether or not first-mover advantages might be
5. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
390-91 (Rand McNally & Co. 1973). F.M. Scherer notes that Pfizer Corporation, a large pharmaceutical manufacturer, charged pharmacists $30 for 100-capsule
bottles of tetracycline while it held the patent on it, whereas production costs were
roughly $1.60 to $3.80. See id.
6. See id. at 384.
7. See JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 19 (Charles M. Sherman ed., Appelton-Century-Croffs, Inc. 1937); Henry
Sidgwick, The Principles of Political Economy 83 (2d ed.) (1887); and Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (Holmes' opinion details the fundamental nature of an author's personality right in her creation).
8. See Lloyd Weinreb, Copyright For Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1149,1226(1998).
9. Id. at 1233.
10. Id. at 1236-37. With respect to arguments in support of the power of convention, see also Pamela Samuelson et. al, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994); and Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
PERFORMANCE
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sufficient to encourage the generation of some information." A
further incentive explored by Weinreb and Breyer is the power of
convention in mitigating the negative effects of a lack of legal
protection." However, on net, monetary inducements are probably
necessary for a great many of the innovative works that the public
currently enjoys.
Drawing upon the above premise, I consider what types of informational works would require the promise of pecuniary compensation to induce their creation. This analysis is significant, because given the often ignored costs of property rights, We should
not be so willing to take for granted the application of intellectual
property law to works that would be created even in its absence.
Moreover, with respect to information production that would require financial incentives, we would be well served to evaluate
whether a government-run reward system might not be superior to
America's traditional intellectual property regime.13
I thus take up the discussion of the reward system in earnest,
initially detailing the drawbacks of traditional intellectual property
rights mentioned previously. Most fundamentally, Scherer describes the paradox of how society offers monopoly rights as a lure
to stimulate the creation of socially valuable information, but it is
precisely that award which leads to the restriction on the use of
such information due to the rent-seeking price charged. 4 The reward system seeks to remedy this dilemma while maintaining financial incentives for innovators to generate socially desirable information. The state would offer and pay a monetary award to
creators of information, hence preserving their incentive to invest

11. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 384-85; Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman,
The Economic Rational of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966); Stephen Breyer,
supra note 10, at 299-302; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW,
INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE § 7, at 4 (forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter SHAVELL, INSTRUCTOR'S
GUIDE] (manuscript on file with author).
12. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1235-37; Breyer, supra note 10, at 282-83.
13. While not seriously addressing the merits of a government reward system,
scholars such as Breyer and Weinreb have opined that while intellectual property rights
provide some degree of incentive to create, they are by no means the only method of
fostering innovation. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 282-83; Weinreb, supra note 8, at
1233-35.
14. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 382.

1998]

AN ECONOMICANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

so that they may be able to develop and produce these works.
However, once the work of information was created, the state
would then make it available to everyone within its domain at
merely its cost of dissemination. In this manner, the optimal social
generation and distribution of information will be achieved.
Creators will still reap the rewards of innovation and therefore
continue to invest and produce works. All consumers who value
the information at or above its marginal cost will now be able to
obtain it without being forced to pay the monopoly rents that previously "priced out" many such individuals. Thus, as long as the
reward is set to reflect the social value of the information, society
will be better off under this government sponsored regime than under our current intellectual property rights system. 5 Incentives to
innovate will be maintained or increased, and dissemination of informational works will become optimal.
This alternative reward regime is quite compelling in theory,
but not without its critics. Detractors of such a system emphasize
practical problems it would face, including how the state would finance and value the awards paid out. In addition, critics raise concerns regarding the threat that a government reward system would
pose to literary and inventive independence. 6 Others voice general
notions that rewards may prove impractical and will not prevent
duplicative effort nor the "race to be first."' 7
Moreover, some scholars worry that the reward system, unlike
15. By "better off," I mean that total utility will increase, and hence social welfare
will be greater as well.
16. See Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 11, at 437. (Within the discussion following
the article, one of the commentators, Robert W. Frase, discussed the threat that government rewards would pose to literary independence.)
17. Duplicative effort and the "race to be first" in the intellectual property area involves the simultaneous expenditure of resources by multiple parties in order that they be
the first to develop the socially valuable information. Being first to produce the information is critical in most every property rights regime, for it usually determines who is
awarded the exclusive right to use and sell the product. However, we must not lose sight
of the wasted effort put forth by the loser of the race, which is a social loss that is usually
unrecoverable. The reward system would not solve this dilemma, but the existence of the
problem militates towards a scheme in which the beneficiary of the reward should be recognized early on in the development of the product, so as to minimize the duplicative effort in the race. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J. LAW & ECON. 265 (1977). A more thorough discussion of the problem can be found
infra, Part II.D.3.
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the patent system, would not naturally harness the specialized information firms possess about the nature of demand, and thus the
government might suffer from information deficiencies in calculating the reward amount. Scherer and Mill similarly argue that
valuation would be arbitrary and uncertain, presumably unlike the
current "steady" state of affairs under intellectual property law as
we know it. 8 However, while assigning a value to the generation
of a given piece of information may present a challenge, it is far
from impossible to do so, as an independent commission could be
established and valuation could be tied to objective market use. 9
Patent experts such as Michael Polanvyi and Lord Stanley conclude that the reward system would actually be fairer and less arbitrary than its current counterpart. ° Moreover, Shavell and Ypersele propose that by offering innovators the option of choosing
between traditional intellectual property rights or the reward system, we could alleviate any informational disadvantages of the
latter.2
18. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 398-99; 5 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY, §4,932 (W. J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green & Co. 1940) (1848).
19. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 7.1.19 (forthcoming
1999) [hereinafter SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] (manuscript on file with author).
However, despite the use of objective valuation measures, Shavell admits this aspect of
the reward system remains a concern. If the government has less information about the
nature of demand for a product than firms do, then the rewards it pays out might not tailor
incentives to produce the good as well as the patent system would. For example, in the
case of an AIDS drug which has a low volume of sales but an incredibly high utility to
each buyer (which the government might underestimate due to lack of information), a
reward system might not pay out enough to induce the creation of the drug in the first
place. This argument is one of Mill's critiques of the reward regime, and one of his reasons for preferencing the patent system. For a discussion, see infra, Part II.D.3.
20. See Michael Polanvyi, PatentReform, 11 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 61, 69 (1944);
Speech of the Right Hon. Lord Stanley, M.P., House of Commons, May 28, 1868, reprinted in RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE ABOLITION OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 111
(n.d.)
21. See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER No. 246 (1998). The authors argue that
since the innovator is in the best position to know the demand for her product, and can
compare that to the government's estimate and corresponding reward, she will rationally
determine whether. rewards or intellectual property rights are better for her. If she
chooses traditional intellectual property protection, both she and society are equally well
off vis-h-vis today's non-optional intellectual property laws. But, if she opts instead for a
government reward, it must be .the case that her welfare is increased by it. Likewise, social welfare will be enhanced because any deadweight loss that would have been created
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Nevertheless, the criticisms of the reward system listed above
do contain some merit, and certainly implementing the reward regime will be long-in-coming since it does not seem to be high on
America's political priority list. Even if such a scheme is not to be
instituted in America though, it behooves society to carefully examine the rationales that make it compelling in theory, and to apply that knowledge to our traditional intellectual property system
when considering modifications or expansions of the law.2
With the above framework and perspectives in mind, this Article suggests that a government-run reward system would best serve
society's pursuit of optimal development and distribution of information. Part I explores the economic and non-economic rationales
for intellectual property rights, whether alternative incentives exist
to produce information in the absence of legal protection, and what
types of informational works would require pecuniary rewards to
induce their creation. Part II discusses the virtues of implementing
a government-run reward system, initially detailing the drawbacks
of intellectual property rights and analyzing past and analogous
implementations of reward systems in practice. Part III surveys
the criticisms that the reward system is likely to encounter, and offers some responses. This Article concludes that such a system
would better serve society's goals than traditional intellectual
property rights do. Even if such a scheme does not achieve popular acceptance however, we must strive to ensure that the lessons
learned from its discussion are applied to make our current laws
achieve more closely the ideal Of socially optimal innovation and
dissemination of information.

by monopoly intellectual property rights will be avoided.
22. Weinreb suggests that Machlup may be correct in his assessment that abandoning the patent system at this juncture would be folly since it is so firmly in place, but that
given the weak justifications for property rights and the alternative incentives to produce,
we should look critically at any proposed expansion of copyright or patent (i.e., especially in duration of protection), and think very carefully about narrowing it. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1243-44 (discussing FRrrz MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM, 80 (1958)).
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I. Do WE NEED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ORDER TO
GENERATE INCENTIVES TO PRODUCE INFORMATIONAL WORKS?

Before the merits and drawbacks of a government-run reward
system may be considered, the justifications given for copyright
and patent protection must be evaluated. The alternative incentives
to generate information, even in their absence must be evaluated.
Finally, what types of works would still require pecuniary inducements must also be evaluated.
A. General JustificationsGiven for Awarding Property Rights
in Information
1. Instrumental/Economic Arguments
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides
that "[t]he Congress shall have the Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."23
The Constitution thus envisions intellectual property rights as a
utilitarian notion aimed at fostering "the progress of science and
useful arts." Completely absent, on its face at least, is any indication that an author has an inherent right to his creation. Quite to
the contrary, Congress is explicitly granted the power to regulate
property rights in information for society's benefit, for they are
legislated rights, not natural rights. Furthermore, when Congress
enacted a comprehensive copyright statute in 1909, the language in
the House Report rejected a natural right as a ground of copyright.24
Underlying the Constitution's philosophy is the concept that
society should seek to encourage the production of valuable informational works, and the method by which it accomplishes that goal
is by giving people an economic incentive to create them. This is
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8[8].
24. H.R. REP. No. 2222 (1909). The House Report stated, "The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any
but upon the ground that the welfare of
natural right that the author has in his writings
the public will be served." Id. at 7.
...
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common sense-people are motivated to act by the promise of
monetary rewards; therefore, Congress provides for them in the
form of intellectual property protection to spur creation. Adam
Smith supported the copyright system on that rationale despite his
disapproval of monopolies in general.2 5 Likewise, Francis Hargrave, on the eve of the American Revolution, offered an eloquent
defense of why authors as well as publishers need legal protection
of their investment in order to have an incentive to create works. 6
Thus, the economic incentive argument for intellectual property protection has been around for centuries and has enjoyed the
support of our Constitution as well as the most prominent scholars
of the day. It seems quite intuitive to encourage the production of
informational works by giving innovators a monetary incentive to
create them.
However, the above instrumental argument is distinct from the
contention that authors would not produce without the promise of
fiscal reward 7 In fact, one can make a decent case that the crea25. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1229,,n. 327. Smith states that:
[T]he author of a new book has an exclusive privilege of publishing and selling his book
for 14 years... as an encouragement to the labours of learned men. And this is perhaps
as well adapted to the real value of the work as any other, for if the book be a valuable
one the demand for it in that time will probably be a considerable addition to his fortune.
Id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 83 (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael &
P.G. Stem, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1896)))..Smith goes on to reject any conception of an author's natural right to his work, arguing, "The only benefit one would have
by writing a book, from the natural laws of reason, would be that he would have the first
of the market and may be thereby a considerable gainer." Id.
26. FRANCIS HARGRAVE, AN ARGUMENT IN DEFENSE OF LITERARY PROPERTY 30-33
(2d ed., Garland Publishing, Inc. 1974) (1774) (quoted in Gillian K. Hadfield, The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective, 38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1, 15-16
(1992)). Hargrave opined:
Every impression of a work is attended with such great [expenses], that nothing
less than securing the sale of a large number of copies within a certain time, can
bring back the money expended, with a reasonable allowance for interest and
profit. But is this to be effected, if immediately after the impression of a book
by one man, all others are to be left at liberty to make and vend impressions of
the same work? ... [E]xperience of the disadvantages of a rivalship so general
would convince all.., in the trade of printing, that it must be ruinous to carry it
on, ... Another great evil, which would arise from annihilating the property in
copies, would be its discouragement of literature of every kind.
Id. See also Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1229-30.
27. See Weinreb, supranote 8, at 1218.
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tive, artistic effort which results in some of what copyright protects
least needs an economic incentive. Scholars such as Weinreb have
expressed that much of what artists and innovators do in this arena,
for example composing music, books, and works of art, is not generally motivated by profit." Furthermore, supporters of the economic justification often ignore the associated negatives of intellectual property rights-rarely is the equally important social goal
of the dissemination of information considered.
That said, I should be careful to note here however that the
economic justifications for property rights in information should
not be disregarded. I do not intend to do any such thing with my
statements above, as instrumental arguments form the backbone of
the government-run reward system I consider later. My purpose
then is simply to explore some alternative justifications and incentives for the production of socially valuable works, which in turn
may imply that the absence of our current intellectual property
rights regime may not be as devastating to the generation of information as some supporters fear.
2. Non-Economic Arguments-Authors' Natural and
Moral Rights
Despite the generally accepted economic rationale behind our
current intellectual property system, the copyright and patent systems likely would not have enjoyed the support or expansion they
have without some background notion of a creator's natural right
to his work. 9 Contrary to the express mandate in the Constitution,
the theory goes that an author is entitled to a property right in her
creation simply because she is the author, and not because it is in
the public's interest.3" In fact, it may even conflict with the public's interest to award a property right (because use and dissemination may be curtailed), but the author's claim is strong enough to
defeat the claims of interest of others. It is argued that historically
the United States' system has not supported such a natural right,

28.
fra, Part
29.
30.

Id. at 1226. Alternative incentives to generate information will be explored inI.B.
See id. at 1211.
See id. at 1217-20.
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but Weinreb notes that is not entirely true.31 Particularly where the
instrumental justifications for intellectual property rights are suspect, the sentiment of an author's entitlement to the fruits of her
labor makes the award of copyright or patent seem far more obvious than it otherwise would.32
There are several branches to the authors' natural right theory.
The most basic approach holds that "but for" the creator, there
would be no work. Hence, to award a property right to the author
deprives no one else of anything that they otherwise would have
had. Henry Sidgwick espoused this view in "The Principles of Political Economy," arguing that, "[it can hardly be an interference
with A's natural liberty to exclude him, in the interest of B, from
the gratuitous use of utilities which he could not possibly have enjoyed except as a result of B's labour. 3 3 Professor Weinreb disagrees with this intuition, claiming that "[t]he relevance of the
conditional depends on the premise... that the author would not
have created the work if she had no copyright in it.

34

More com-

pelling in my mind is the somewhat subtle point that once the existence of a work is known, and more so if it has entered the common cultural background, those who are denied access to it may be
worse off than if it had never been created. Their lack of access
may engender frustrations, and they may also be made relatively
less powerful compared to those who have access.3
The second natural/moral right justification for allowing property rights in information is a personality-based argument. The rationale is that "the fruits of intellectual creativity are associated
with their author in a peculiarly intimate way" that necessitates her
31. See id. at 1211.
32. See id.

33. Sidgwick, supra note 7, at 83.
34. Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1218.
35. See id. at 1218-19. Weinreb notes that if the work in question is a beautiful
sonnet, the potential for frustration may seem small or farfetched, but at a more common
level, deprivation from cable TV or daily comic strips or pulp fiction may be more "real"
indeed. Furthermore, he adds that the "disempowerment of being denied access to works
that are emblematic of the community's culture is palpable and has many dimensions,
ranging from the educational value of preschool television shows or encyclopedias to the
ability to communicate one's message effectively." Id. at 1219. See also Michael Madow,
Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L.
REV.

125 (1993) (discussing the privatization of cultural icons by the right of publicity).
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having a right to her work.3 None other than Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes recognized this reason behind intellectual property rights, observing in Bleistein v. Donaldson,7 "[plersonality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity
even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it
something irreducible, which is one man's alone."38 In addition,
Immanuel Kant argued in the eighteenth century that a work so reflects its creator's personality that she should have the right to be
protected from "garbled" imitations that might degrade her audience's overall impression of the quality of the production.39
Moreover, one might submit that a person's creation is an aspect of
their individual liberty, which is part of their self. However, it
does not necessarily follow from the enjoyment of liberty that one
can control all the consequences of what he or she does. For instance, the liberty to drink alcohol does not mean one has the right
not to get drunk from it. Hence, it is more compelling that once a
creator publishes her work, She has broken the personality-based
connection between herself and the work, and thus loses this moral
right to protection of her product.4"
6

A third, more common justification offered in support of a
natural right to intellectual property protection can be generally described as a labor/effort argument. This line of reasoning is in essence a derivation of John Locke's elaboration of a natural right to
property in his Second Treatise on Government.4 1 Michelman has
argued along "Lockeian" lines that "whenever one mingles his effort with the raw stuff of the world, any resulting product oughtsimply ought-to be his., 4' Additionally, Adam Smith has
strongly asserted the property right of an individual to his labor:
"The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the

36. Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1219.
37. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
38. Id. at 250.
39. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 290.
40. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1220-21.
41. Locke, supra note 7, at 18-33.
42. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof "JustCompensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1204 (1967).
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original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred
and inviolable. 4 3 Again, it seems like common sense that a creator
is entitled to be compensated for her labor, and thus should enjoy a
property right in the information her effort generates.
While this makes sense, there are some problems with the "labor theory of value." An often unspoken premise of the rationale
is that there is "as much" and "as good" left over from which others can work with, but this is often contrary to fact (although, in
the realm of intellectual property, it is probably not a great problem). 4 More critical though is the conception of what qualifies as
"labor." As Weinreb notes, "[i]f the author's claim is based on his
labor and not just his status as creator, one needs first of all to establish that he has labored., 45 A skeptic might argue that authors
have the "fun" of composing their works, while readers have the
"burden" of reading them. For instance, authors must pay their
editors to read their works. Thus, what is labor and what is not depends on society's structure of what people are willing to pay for
the good or service; and it is difficult to justify a natural property
right on that basis.
In sum, the various natural right justifications for our current
intellectual property protection all have significant shortcomings.
Professor (now Justice) Breyer pointed out some of these criticisms in his piece, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
46
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs.
Breyer opined that "to speak of the 'fruits of one's labor' does not
show that the author should be paid more than his persuasion cost
or how much more he should be paid., 47 Furthermore, he pushed
aside the personality-based arguments for protection, stating,
"[o]ne suspects that many authors dislike copying because of the
injury to their purse, not their pride., 48 And, he argued that even if
43. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 138 (W.B. Todd ed., Liberty Classics 1981) (n.d.).
44. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1224. When one person composes a brilliant
novel for instance, it is unlikely that she has so thoroughly exhausted the topic written
upon that no one else would be able to enter the area.

45. Id. at 1226.
46. Breyer, supra note 10, at 284-91.
47. Id. at 286.
48. Id. at 290.
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the justifications were accepted, they do not require accepting a
system of copyright law, for there are many other ways of protecting and encouraging the generation of information in the absence
of intellectual property rights.49 It is those alternatives that will be
explored below.
B. Alternative Incentives to ProduceInformational Works in
the Absence of Copyright or PatentProtection
Given the shortcomings of the natural rights arguments for intellectual property protection, and to a much lesser extent those of
the economic/instrumental rationale, we must explore the alternative incentives to generate information in the absence of explicit
property rights. For some types of works, the desire for personal
satisfaction, respect and esteem may motivate creators to produce.
Additionally, first mover advantages and the power of convention
may stem the effects of the absence of property rights. Still
though, there are certainly many types of socially valuable information whose production does depend on economic incentives,"
and it is for these that we must consider the virtues of a government-run reward system.
1. Personal Satisfaction
It has been said that the creative, artistic effort, which today results in some forms of copyright protection, least needs a property
rights incentive in order to encourage it." Scholars such as Weinreb have expressed that much of what artists and innovators do in
this arena is generally not motivated by profit. 2 Literally millions
of individuals compose music, books, and beautiful works of art
without serious expectation of reward. For most, the effort expended is compensation enough. Likewise, for many artists, their
work is their passion and serves as an emotional outlet in which the
49. See id. at 290-91.
50. See infra Part I.C.
51. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1232.
52. Id. at 1226. Weinreb's argument does not enjoy overwhelming support though,
as most law and economics scholars, including Shavell, believe that financial inducements are necessary to encourage creation of a good deal of what society commonly enjoys. See SHAVELL, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE, supra note 11, § 7, at 7.
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psychological benefits significantly outweigh the pecuniary ones.
Professor Shavell raises the example of diaries and letters, asserting that people are not usually induced to correspond and to keep
diaries for profit or publication; hence, copyright protection would
be unlikely to dramatically spur production.53 However, he notes
that the areas in which personal satisfaction alone would suffice to
54
encourage creation are probably not very numerous.
2. Respect and Esteem
In addition, the desire for the respect and esteem of one's peers
or audience often leads to the generation of some types of socially
valuable information, even without an intellectual property right
incentive. Landes and Posner note that "[m]any authors derive
substantial benefits from publication that are over and beyond any
royalties. This is true not only in terms of prestige and other nonpecuniary income, but also pecuniary income in such forms as a
higher salary for a professor who publishes than for one who does
Aside from the financial component, Weinreb adds,
not."
"[a]dvancement and honor in one's field, including the academic
prize of tenure, are other forms of compensation for authorship, as
the notorious slogan, 'publish or perish' attests."56 Certainly, there
is a great prestige value to composing a book or article or piece of
art recognized as a leading piece in its field. These incentives will
always be present, regardless of whether one is awarded monopoly
rights in her work.

53. However, Shavell notes that for famous individuals, the presence of copyright
protection might encourage them to write better, more complete diaries and/or letters. In
addition, a person's interest in privacy will be protected by copyright in their writings,
which should stimulate these works. However, the production incentive and privacy issues must be balanced against the public's interest in having access to these types of information despite the fact that a public figure may not want it to be released. See
SHAVELL, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE, supra note 11, § 7, at 7.
54. Id.
55. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Ah Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUDIES 325, 331 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
56. Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1233.
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3. First Mover Advantages
First mover advantages may further allow innovators to capture
a certain degree of the economic rewards that intellectual property
rights aim to bestow even without the actual conferral of such legal
rights. Despite the often high fixed costs borne by the author of an
informational work,57 Hurt and Schuchman argue that her advantage in terms of lead time coupled with the credible threat of retaliation against copiers will enable her to reap much of the economic rewards that she is due." The argument holds that although
the first publisher faces higher fixed costs than her imitator-rival,
as first mover she can gauge demand conditions correctly and publish a first edition that will satiate demand at the projected price."59
Since fixed costs will not be negligible for a copier, and assuming
low marginal costs for both parties, it would likely be necessary for
the rival "to publish an edition in the same size range as the first
edition in order to bring his average costs significantly below those
of the first publisher., 61 If the first mover had estimated demand
correctly, the large number of newly available books will drive
price lower to clear the excess supply, theoretically making entry
an unprofitable yenture for the copier. 6' Hence, "[t]he mere threat
57. For instance, such fixed costs may include large outlays for plant, editorial
work, overhead, selling, and promotion which a copier may not have to bear. See Landes
& Posner, supra note 55, at 332.
58. See Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 11, at 427-28.
59. See id. at 428.
60. Id.
61. Consider an example similar to that of Prof. Shavell's: Assume relatively high
fixed costs for the first publisher to be $40,000 and marginal costs equal to $3 per book.
If demand will meet the production of 2000 books at a price of $30 each, the first publisher's profit will be: (2000 books x $30 price) - $40,000 fixed cost - (1500 books x $3
marginal cost) = $15,500. Let us assume that if a copier enters the market, he faces
lower, but still significant, fixed costs in the amount of $30,000, because although copying technology saves the cost of setting the type face, any rival publisher still must account for converting the book into a marketable product, i.e. binding it, distributing it,
and placing it on store shelves. Thus, if the rival also faces marginal costs of $3 per
book, and let's say there are 1000 potential buyers willing to pay $25, his costs will be
$30,000 fixed cost + (1000 books x $3) = $33,000, making the average cost = $33. Thus,
at a price of $25, the copier would be losing money. Moreover, we should note that the
first mover can always choose to increase production when he detects entry by a rival,
and sell at any price above marginal cost (and still increase his profits) while effectively
driving the copier out of business before he can recover his costs. See SHAVELL,
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of retributive behavior by the first publisher should be sufficient to
deter the copier until the first
62 edition is sold out and the first pubprofit.
his
made
lisher has
Professor Weinreb shares this view, asserting further advantages that the publisher of an original work possesses over her
copying competitors despite her higher costs. For instance, the
first mover determines the format of the first published edition as
well as the time and the circumstances in which it is published.63
Furthermore, like Hurt and Schuchman, Weinreb suggests that
original authors may be able to produce an expensive "limited" or
"authorized" edition in order to take advantage of potential opportunities for product differentiation.6" He also opines that despite
advances in copying technology, bringing a book or musical recording to market takes more than merely copying the work-it
must be bound and packaged into a marketable product, distributed, and placed on store shelves, all of which requires considerable time and effort.65
Moreover, the first mover argument is not limited solely to
copyrightable works, as both Tirole and Scherer argue that markets
and knowledge are not always perfectly competitive with respect
to patentable inventions.66 Scherer asserts that the imitation of inventions may not eliminate the inventor's profits because of three
phenomena. First, there are natural barriers to copying new products and processes, created partially by the secrecy of the developer." Second, knowledge is rarely perfect, and it therefore takes
time for entrepreneurs to learn about the existence of a promising
new invention and to then also decide it is worth copying and

supra note 11, § 7, at 4-5.
62. Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 11, at 428.
63. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1234-35.
64. Id. See also Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 11, at 428. The authors assert that
the "authorization" of the first edition by the author may be a marketable asset. See id.
As an offer of proof, they suggest that J.R.R. Tolkien effectively used such a device to
promote an authorized soft cover edition of the Lord of the Rings trilogy at the same time
a rival copied edition was available which paid no royalties to Mr. Tolkien. See id.
65. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1235.
66. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 384-87; JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 400-01 (1988).
67. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 384.
INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE,
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bringing to market. 6' For example, he cites data compiled by Edwin Mansfield which indicate substantial lag times for the copying
of innovations which everybody now takes for granted, such as
packaging beer in tin cans and the development of diesel locomotives. 69 Thirdly, Scherer states that mere awareness that an attractive new product exists is often an inadequate basis for successful
imitation, even after patent specifications are examined and analyzed.7° For financial success, the copier may also require technical assistance from the innovator, specific know-how which can
only come from carrying out one's own research and development,
or the hiring away of several of the innovator's key engineers. 7 '
Finally, companies may have an incentive to engage in research
and development even without the promise of copyright or patent
protection in order to enhance their corporate image and to guard
against being foreclosed from some field of technology by another
firm exercising parallel patent rights.7
Despite this line of reasoning, arguments supporting the first
mover advantage have come under heavy scrutiny in recent times
from such notable scholars as Breyer, Shavell, and Landes and
Posner.73 While the theory behind it is certainly interesting, advances in modem copying technology have widened the cost disparity between original creator and copier.74 At the same time,
technological improvements have shortened the time duration between the release of the creator's version and the appearance of the
rival's copy." In addition, Shavell emphasizes that the first mover

68. See id. at 385.
69. The approximate interval between first use of diesel locomotives in the United
States and the date when 60% of all relevant producers had imitated the process was 11
years. The interval for high speed beer bottle fillers was 7 years, and the interval for
packaging beer in tin cans was 1 year. See id. at 385.

70. See id.
71. See id. Tirole agrees with the engineering "lack of know-how" argument, offering that "[ilmitators may observe an innovation with a lag, or may not have the knowhow to copy it immediately. Indeed, patents play a minor role in some industries (e.g.,
computers)." TIROLE, supra note 66, at 400.
72. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 385-86.
73. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 299-302; Landes & Posner, supra note 55, at 330;
and SHAVELL, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE, supra note 11, § 7, at 4-5.
74. See Landes & Posner, supra note 55, at 330.
75. See id. See also SHAVELL, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE, supra note 11, § 7, at 5.
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argument presumes high fixed costs and low marginal costs of
production, which is often not the case today. 6 Furthermore, Hurt
and Schuchman's assessment of the first publisher's advantage depends on him being able to sell to a large group of high paying
customers initially. However, this prerequisite will not be met if
the rival copier can enter the market quickly; or even if buyers become somewhat more sophisticated and begin to anticipate entry,
and therefore hold back on their purchases until the imitator's copy
is released."
Hence, in today's and future markets, the advantage of being
first would not often be sufficient to assure large profits, especially
when compared to the financial rewards intellectual property rights
afford creators. However, the reward system could maintain these
monetary inducements while eliminating many of the drawbacks
that property rights in information present.
4. The Power of Convention
Even without alternative economic or psychological'benefits to
generating socially useful works of information, the power of convention may be enough in limited instances to preserve the incentives for creators to produce.
Professor Weinreb places a great deal of faith in this proposition, arguing that if there is a demand for a certain informational
good, the market will attempt to work out a solution to provide it,
even in the absence of explicit legal protection or incentives." In
support, he points out that although books published in England in
the nineteenth century were not covered by copyright in the United
States, American publishers nonetheless paid royalties to English
authors for the right to reproduce their works.79 Implicit in this
practice was that an industry convention had emerged which both
parties were satisfied with, despite what an outside observer might
see as constant incentives to deviate from the custom. As a further
example, Weinreb argues that the fashion industry has "thrived de76. See SHAVELL,

INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE, supra note 11, § 71 at 5.
77. Id.
78. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1235-37.
79. See id. at 1235.
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spite the absence of protection for designs and the prevalence of
'knock-offs.'"° In fact, he believes the industry has worked out a
system where it depends on knock-offs, which appear in a regular
cycle, to create consumer demand for new fashions.81 Lastly, the
data collection industry complained vociferously prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,2 that if data were not protected by intellectual
property laws, it would wreak havoc on the production of such information. 3 Quite to the contrary, even after the Supreme Court
rejected copyright coverage, the industry goes on similarly to how
it functioned previously, having Suffered few significant effects.8 '
Breyer also presents this "power of convention" argument, recognizing the above-described practice adhered to by English and
American publishers in the nineteenth century. He adds that
authors in ancient times, as well as monks and scholars in the middle ages, composed and were financially compensated for their
writings despite the lack of any copyright protection. 5 Additionally, Breyer suggests (though he does not. conclude) that "[i]t
would be possible.., to do without copyright, [by] relying upon
authors, publishers, and buyers to work out arrangements among
themselves that would provide books' creators with enough money
to produce them." 6 After conducting a study in which he attempted to estimate the result of a lack of copyright protection, he
found that the production of some high cost, high volume books
(such as elementary and high school texts) might be significantly
affected, but otherwise there would probably not be "a serious loss
of production" overall.87
Hence, though intellectual property rights are often taken for

80. Id.
81. See id. at 1235 n. 347.
82. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
83. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1235-36.
84. See id. at 1236. Weinreb notes that "even the production of telephone directories, the product specifically denied copyright in Feist, has not been affected." Id.
85. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 282 (citing G. PUTNAM, AUTHORS AND THEIR
PUBLIC IN ANCIENT TIMES 140, 200, 224-25 (2d rev. ed. 1894); 2 G. PUTNAM, BOOKS AND
THEIR MAKERS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 478-79 (1896)).
86. Id. at 282.
87. Id. at 313.
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granted, we should not ignore the possibility that markets might
find ways to function efficiently and effectively in their absence.
That is not to say that some industries would not serve the public
interest less well, but rather, that such an event is not a foregone
conclusion. Still, it is undoubtedly the case that many types of information will depend upon financial rewards for their generation,
and it is for these that the virtues of a reward regime must be taken
seriously.
C. For What Types of Informational Works are Pecuniary
Incentives Necessary?
The above discussion of alternative incentives available to generate socially valuable information does not imply pecuniary rewards are unnecessary; only that they are not always necessary nor
the sole motivation behind innovation and creation. It is essential
to consider which types of informational works are specifically
amenable to monetary incentives, for those are the ones society
should concentrate on providing a financial inducement for. However, that objective does not inevitably mean that copyright or patent law must be the instrument that provides the pecuniary incentives. A government-run reward system would ideally be able to
accomplish the same goal of fostering creation without many of the
drawbacks inherent in our current intellectual property regime."
Hurt and Schuchman propose several examples of informational works whose production Would be drastically inadequate in
the absence of pecuniary rewards to their creators.89 They assert
quite reasonably that "when the costs of creation, as opposed to
publication and distribution, constitute a significant proportion of
total costs, and these costs [are] not incurred by copiers,. . . pecuniary reimbursement for the author [is required] before the work
will even be conceived."90
Commonly enjoyed informational
works that fall into this category include encyclopedias, almanacs,
maps, and many mass circulation periodicals.9 Technical subscription publications for professionals such as attorneys and phy88.
89.
90.
91.

See infra Part lI.B. for a discussion.
See Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 11, at 426.
Id.
See id.
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sicians would also be seriously threatened or non-existent in the
absence of pecuniary inducements. 2 With regard to novels and
other fictional works, it may be true that initially many authors
write seeking personal satisfaction or reputational objectives ahead
of financial ones. However, it is less likely that once authors obtain that gratification or esteem, that they would produce the line of
subsequent novels that is often witnessed and highly enjoyed by
their audiences today. It is not improbable that the. promise of
monetary reward has played a large role in the succession of works
by Stephen King, Tom Clancy, or Danielle Steel, and has resulted
in the continued production of "value" for their respective readers.
Additionally, beyond the realm of literature, one would expect
that a great deal of what we have come to enjoy in popular culture
would be seriously reduced. Major motion pictures now routinely
cost over $100 million to produce before any revenue is realized.93
If rival studios could simply copy a competitor's film and reap the
profits, it is unlikely that most, or even any, substantial movie
projects would be undertaken. The same holds true for a large
majority of the programs that we watch every night on televisionthere are often significant up front costs to their creation and little
expense involved in their reproduction.94
More importantly perhaps, the production of many highly socially valuable innovations and inventions largely depends upon
the creator's ability and expectation that she will reap economic
profits in return for her effort and expense. Prime examples that
92. See id.
93. The production costs alone for the average summer "event movie" are $70 million. See Tim Carvell, How Sony Created a Monster: Sony Spent $125 Million to make
Godzilla. Is it any Good? Does it Really Matter? The Studio has Marshaled Another
$200 Million to Invade the Public's Imagination and Make Sure the Movie's a Hit,
FORTUNE, June 8, 1998, at 162. Major studios spend in excess of an additional $22 million on marketing costs. See id. Films such as TERMINATOR 2, TITANIC, and GODZILLA
cost hundreds of millions of dollars each. See id.
94. However, with respect to television programs, certain types of shows would
certainly be less vulnerable to threat of copying than others. For instance, if one station is
broadcasting a live football game, a competitor that copies it and reproduces it on another
channel will largely be unsuccessful in capturing any audience if there is a time delay in
its transmission. Thus, if there is a substantial advantage to being first, and little residual
profits remaining for second comers, the absence of legal/pecuniary incentives to generate the work in the first place will have a reduced effect.
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immediately come to mind include the large majority of patented
pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices, as well as many of the
advances in computer technology and software generation. Although Scherer argues that imperfect markets and information will
often make research and development expenditures worthwhile
even in the absence of patent protection, 95 it, would be naive to
think that firms will invest strikingly large sums of money into a
venture when there is a significant probability that the fruits of
their efforts could be duplicated at considerably less cost and effectively "stolen." Even if first mover advantages, imperfect
knowledge, and power of convention obstacles to copying exist, as
long as there is some positive probability that results of one's investment will be appropriated by another who now faces lower
costs, firms will factor that into their calculus of what projects are
economically sensible. Provided that firms will not be able to obtain pecuniary rewards to the extent that they currently are able to,
it is likely that the generation of certain socially desirable products
will be diminished.
As mentioned above, the computer technology, software, and
pharmaceutical markets are obvious arenas where this dynamic
could exact a devastating toll. The development costs that go into
computer programs are often enormous, while the cost of duplicating the end result is virtually zero. The value that consumers
obtain from Microsoft Windows and other software would be in
serious jeopardy if their producers thought the investment to create
the product might not later be recovered because of a rival's
copying. 96 Likewise, numerous medical devices and life-saving
drugs, including the AIDS cocktail for instance, would be lost to
society since they require such large initial investments based
solely on the promise of future monetary reward. It is certainly the
95. See prior discussion of Scherer's views on R & D incentives, supra Part I.B.3.
96. I should make clear here that in any industry, firms face uncertain prospects of
obtaining future financial compensation for their current investment and development
efforts, and yet still engage in many of those endeavors., This reality of business requires
an assessment that the potential for compensation for a given project multiplied by the
magnitude of the 'compensation outweighs the development costs that will go into it.
However, if after this evaluation is made in the affirmative, firms know that competitors
can copy their creation and reduce their profits, many previously feasible (and hopefully
socially useful) projects will be abandoned contrary to society's best interests.
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case then that many of the advances in technology-based industries
would be threatened, for their development depends significantly
upon pecuniary inducements.
Hence, for the above described works, society cannot simply
remove intellectual property right protection and rely on other currently available incentives to generate the socially optimal amount
of the information. Most scholars in the field feel that monetary
rewards are probably necessary for the creation of a significant
portion of what we value. 97 The issue though is whether that financial inducement is best provided by America's current intellectual
property regime as opposed to some alternative, most notably, a
government-run reward system.
II.

WOULD A REWARD SYSTEM BE SUPERIOR TO INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS?

I have previously discussed the notions behind, and the justifications for, property rights in information. Now, we must consider
the problems our current intellectual property laws possess, and
whether a reward system might enable our social goals of fostering
both the generation and the dissemination of information to be
better met.
A. Problems of America's CurrentIntellectual Property
System
1. Restriction of Use
While copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret protection
do serve society's interests by offering the promise of monopoly
rights to encourage innovation, less (but growing) attention has
been paid to the costs such property rights exact on users. Thomas
Macauley made the point powerfully in his First Speech on Copyright, stating accusatorily that copyright was "a tax on readers for
the purpose of giving a bounty to writers."98 Law and economics
scholars Besen and Raskind add that while providing property
97. See

SHAVELL, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE,

supra note 11, § 7, at 4.

98. Breyer, supra note 10, at 281 (citing
COPYRIGHT 25 (C. Gaston. ed. 1914)).

THOMAS MACAULAY, SPEECHES ON
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rights incentives may foster innovation, "if the new innovations are
not widely used, the system may be less beneficial than one with
less creativity, but where the materials created are more broadly
disseminated." 99
Thus, we see the. inherent conflict that our intellectual property
regime faces-it must strike a most difficult balance between creating incentives to innovate versus maximizing the distribution and
utilization of socially valuable information. Scherer notes that
while the goal of the patent system is to maximize the surplus of
benefits over costs, an immediate paradox appears."m As an inducement to creation, "inventors are given the right to control and
restrict utilization of their inventions, so that outputs may be lower
and prices higher than they would be if the inventions were utilized
under purely competitive conditions."'' 1 Landes and Posner frame
the problem similarly: "Copyright protection... trades off the
costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing
incentives to create the work in the first place. Striking the correct
balance between access and incentives is the central problem in
copyright law."'0 2
We must query however whether this noble objective is being
met in the best manner possible. While legal protection no doubt
fosters pharmaceutical production, the often excessively high cost
of patented drugs (which are frequently characterized by quite
inelastic demand curves) strains the budgets of many consumers.
Furthermore, the effect of intellectual property rights on prices in
the medical and pharmaceutical industries is no doubt partially responsible for the shockingly high numbers of Americans who cannot afford health insurance in the first place.' 3 For instance,
99. Stanley M- Besen and Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSPEcTIvES 3, 6 (1991).
100. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 382.
101. Id. It is worthwhile to note here that the pitfall Scherer describes is precisely
the one that the reward system aims to eliminate. The government would pay innovators
for their creation and then disseminate the work at its marginal cost with no property
rights limitations attached. In this manner, the reward system seeks to come as close as
possible to allowing and maximizing utilization of the inventions in a purely competitive
environment.
102. Landes & Posner, supra note 55, at 326.
103. At last count, approximately 15% of the United States population, some 40
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Scherer notes that while Pfizer's production costs for tetracycline,
a potent antibiotic, ranged between $1.60 and $3.80 per bottle, it
sold the drug to pharmacists for $30.60." 4 He adds that "[m]any
similar cases of price-cost margins on the order of 90% have been
identified.""' 5 It is not hard to imagine the substantial deadweight
loss created by this kind of monopoly pricing-literally thousands
of beneficial "trades" are not occurring even though the customer's
willingness to pay exceeds the producer's cost. 10 6 The same can
certainly be said of the software market, where, depending upon
the version and where it is being sold, prices for Microsoft Word
run from approximately $85 to $340, yet the cost of reproducing a
copy is virtually zero."07 This largely leads individual consumers to
pirate the software, while primarily businesses are the entities who
can or try to afford it. Undoubtedly though, much "fancy" specialty software, such as the CAESAR II computer program for engineering pipe stress design, goes unpurchased despite8 the mutual
benefit its use would have upon firms and consumers.
Hence, current intellectual property rights are subject to the serious criticisrm that they inevitably lead to less than socially optimal use of the information and products they protect.

million Americans, cannot afford basic health care coverage. See J. FOLEY, SOURCES OF
HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED (Employee Benefit Research Inst. 1992) (on file with author).
104. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 390-91.
105. Id. at 391.
106. See discussion of deadweight loss resulting from monopoly pricing, supra note
3.
107. See Edward Mendelson, Microsoft Word 97; Word ProcessingSoftware: One
of 12 Evaluations of Components of Three Office Suites; Individual Evaluation Records
Searchable Under "Suite Deals"; Software Review; Evaluation, PC MAGAZINE, Feb. 18,
1997, at 152.
108. The CAESAR II program is vital engineering software used in the design of
piping plants, and currently costs approximately $6000, enough to discourage its purchase by most individual consumers. Telephone Interview with Donald J.Calandrillo,
former Pipe Stress/Support Engineer, Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (Mar. 22, 1998).
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2. The Race to be First
In addition to the problem of restricted use, current intellectual
property laws lead to what is commonly known as "the race to be
first."'09 Relying on the promise of a copyright or patent reward,
innovators invest resources in the attempt to develop useful information. It is unlikely though that merely one party will be undertaking this investment; rather, the case is usually that multiple parties are simultaneously working on somewhat similar projects in
the hope of generating information that our laws will reward.
However, only the first to develop the information will attain the
property right. This reality understandably creates a race to be
first, leading firms and even individuals to potentially invest and
develop information more quickly than what would be optimal to
maximize the final product's social value.
...
Unlike the restricted use problem, the race to be first dilemma
is not one that is easily remedied by a government-run reward
system. However, as Kitch's discussion of the patent system implies, the negative effects of socially wasteful duplicative effort
can be mitigated if property rights are awarded relatively early on
so as to shorten this period of simultaneous investment by multiple
parties."' Once the vital aspects of the informational work are deduced so that only the refinement of the product remains, the innovator should be recognized and given the reward rights to the social value she creates. However, in the patent system, if too little
of the work has been developed but the creator is still given a
property right in it, then incentives to innovate may be dampened.
First, the monopoly right may lessen the immediate inducement to
reduce the product to a more socially useful or commercially viable form. Further, no other individual contemplating a similar invention would expend much effort to develop the product since
someone else holds the patent rights. At least in a government-run
reward regime, even if an individual created a socially useful work
but was slow or uninterested in developing it further, other parties

109. See Kitch, supra note 17, at 278-79.
110. See id.
111. Seeid.
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similarly situated would have an incentive to build off of it since
no monopoly rights preventing duplication or further improvement
would be bestowed on the first party.
Nevertheless, the race to be first poses a problem for both
America's current intellectual property regime and the rewardbased alternative. Society must seek to ascertain the optimal point
for recognizing an innovation to reduce duplicative effort while
still maintaining proper incentives to generate information.
3. Allocative Efficiency Versus Inefficiency
A related difficulty to the race to be first is that of allocative efficiency in the intellectual property system."' It is often argued
that copyright and patent protection serve to create allocative efficiency by steering resources to their most productive use. The
greater the market demand for a particular informational work, the
greater will be its supply since its creator will see the large potential for economic reward.11 3 In the absence of intellectual property
rights, the argument runs that society's demand will exceed supply
since innovators will be unable to capture the social value their
works create." 4 However, by awarding property rights in information, we will encourage the production of informational works.
Assuming there are no transaction costs preventing mutually beneficial trades between buyers and sellers, social welfare will be optimal because we have made the private producer's calculus equal
to the social problem.
While this economic analysis certainly contains a large degree
of truth, we should not ignore some of the allocative inefficiencies
created by the award of an intellectual property right."5 The very
incentive to obtain a copyright or patent monopoly in the first
place may divert resources inefficiently from the production of
non-authorial goods that must compete without the benefit of monopoly to those that are covered by such rights. For example,
Weinreb notes that "[i]nsofar as copyright directs resources toward

112.
113.
114.
115.

See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1237, 1246-47.
See id at 1237.
Seeid.
See id. at 1247.
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expression and away from ideas, its allocative effect seems perverse. Large, innovative conceptions, like the stream of consciousness in fiction or cubism in art, are denied protection in favor
of smaller differences of expression.". 6 Thus, within the realm of
copyright at least, achieving efficiency or market success (which is
undoubtedly the goal of many authors today) cannot necessarily be
argued to be the full measure of social value." 7 If innovators' efforts are artificially channeled into one area of information generation over another, society should not ignore the reality that it is
losing the benefit of some creations precisely because of the intellectual property laws' effect. A reward system must similarly confront this issue, and structure its incentives to minimize the problem.
4. Further Problems Specific to the Patent System
There are several other problems unique to the patent system,
many of which a reward regime would correct.
First, there are the requirements of novelty, non-obviousness,
and utility that serve as prerequisites to obtaining a patent." 8 The
first two make a good deal of intuitive and economic sense-we
only want to award a (temporary) monopoly right to that which is
new (novelty), and that which would not have soon been created
anyway because its development would have been obvious to individuals skilled in the relevant field. However, the last prong of
usefulness (utility), while seeming to initially be a matter of common sense, does not have a sound economic justification. While it
is the case that society does not want to encourage the production
of useless information, Shavell notes that there would be little reason for any individual or firm to do so given that they would find
no one willing to pay for it." 9 Further, what may seem to lack usefulness to an outside observer might in fact actually possess some
utility that is merely not clear at the present. Society would not
want to discourage the generation of such information, especially if
we presume that its creator has better specialized knowledge of the
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1241.
See id. at 1247.
See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1994).
See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, § 7.1.15.
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area in question than we do. 2 ° A government sponsored reward
system would do well to omit this requirement when formulating
its test-as long as valuation is based on some measure of use, this
goal will be accomplished.
Additionally, scholars such as Fritz Machlup have argued that
patents discourage the creation of subsequent inventions.' Parties
who wish to pursue successor inventions face the risk that their efforts will be for naught if they are found to infringe upon the scope
of the current patent holder's rights.' Machlup cites patent scholars who offer that "the history of inventions accordingly teems
with accounts of trifling improvements patented, that have put a
stop, for a long period, to other similar and much greater improvements. It teems also with accounts of improvements carried
into effect the instant some patents had expired."'2 3 This directly
refutes the argument that the exclusive rights granted to inventors'
do not deprive others of anything that they had possessed before.
However, under a reward regime, once a given piece of information is generated, the reward goes to the innovator and all others
will be able to freely utilize the information to expand upon the
existing scope of knowledge. 4
Scherer elucidates several further social costs of the patent
system. In addition to the obvious monopoly pricing problem, he
argues that companies often extend their monopoly from patents
120. See Id. Fortunately though, it should be noted that the requirement of utility is
often a weak one, and that the real test courts seem to be progressively focusing on is that
of non-obviousness.
121. See Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth
Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 2 (1950) (giving a "systematic account" of controversies
surrounding patents and concluding that views have hardly changed throughout the century).
122. See id. at 24.
123. Id. (citing ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1851, at 114-15).
124. However, scholars such as Shavell have argued that this effect may be undermined by efforts of those seeking rewards to "hold back" on their inventions until they
can improve them (and thus receive greater compensation). In addition, even if the development of second innovations depends upon first innovations, that does not necessarily mean we should afford lesser protection against copying and freely using those first
innovations. It is true that broad patent protection granted to first innovations may lower
the incentives of others to invest in developing subsequent improvements, but the broader
the scope of rights awarded to the first innovation, the greater the incentive for that first
invention to be made. See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19,§ 7.1.14(d).
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by "fencing in" a field of technology. 2 ' For instance, when du
Pont researchers invented nylon, they blanketed their scientific
findings With hundreds of patent applications addressing the whole
array of similar molecular variations to prevent rivals from developing any substitutes. 2 6 Similarly, firms seek to extend their monopoly power over time by prolonging the effective life of basic
patents and by amassing improvement patents only when basic
patents are about to expire.2 7 Finally, Scherer charges that the patent system permits the suppression of inventions from which the
public would benefit, and states that companies often spend substantial sums of money inventing around the patent position of ri"'
vals. 28
These concerns would be considerably alleviated or even
irrelevant under a reward system, where successive innovators
would be able to freely use past works absent property right barriers, and thus incentives existing today to prolong patent life, fence
in fields, and to invent around prior patents would be eliminated.
Lastly,-in arguing for patent reform in the form of a generalized
public reward system, Polanvyi asserts that a final problem of patents in the United States is that they are often uncertain as to
scope."' This deficiency frequently leads litigation and accompanying administrative costs to grow inordinately. 30 He further
views the patent system as benefiting the wealthy, for the financial
position of the applicant significantly affects her chances of obtaining and profiting from the patent right. It is unclear, however,
how the reward system would dramatically reduce this problem.
Finally, Polanvyi urges that the process of legally establishing the
125. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 391.
126. See id.
127.- See id. Scherer describes how applicants have been known to intentionally delay Patent Office procedural matters while their application was pending in order to extend the life of their basic patents. See id.
128. See id. at 392. In discussing how firms might hoard patents to bolster their
market positions, Scherer discusses recurrent rumors that "some shadowy power in the
automobile or petroleum industry has obtained and suppressed patents on a carburetor
which would let full-sized autos travel 50 miles per gallon of gasoline." Id. Additionally,
he raises the case of James Watts' steam engine patent as an example where denial of access to his patent prevented the work of Homblower, Trevithick, and others on high pressure engines until the patent expired in 1800. See id.
129. See Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 70.
130. See id.
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requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness "leads in
each case to serious abuses
of legalism," which a reward system
3
would be less susceptible. 1
5. Further Problems Specific to the Copyright System
Like the three elements mentioned above that are necessary to
obtain a patent, several requirements must be met before copyright
protection will ensue. First, the item in question must be "fixed,"
that is, reduced to a tangible medium such that courts can verify its
existence. 132 Second, "expression" is copyrightable while "ideas"
are not, the theory being that if exclusive rights adhered to functional or other ideas, the very ability to communicate would be seriously restricted. 33 Finally, the work must possess sufficient
"originality,"'' 34 which is a fairly broad concept indeed. It is interesting to note that the originality requirement for copyright is substantially different and weaker than the novelty, nonobviousness,
and utility prerequisites for patent. 3 However, when one considers that a copyright's value is based on the inherently subjective
utility one obtains from another's expression of ideas, it is easy to
understand why an objective usefulness calculus would be impossible to administer.
In other areas of copyright debate though, critics such as
Breyer and Weinreb are skeptical of the constantly increasing duration of protection, which today runs from the time of creation of
the work until fifty years after the author's death. 3 6 One should
question from an economic perspective whether awarding property
rights in information for such an extended of a period of time cre-

131. Id. at71.
132. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West Supp. 1999).
133. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell
Systems, Inc., 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990). See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) for the statutory
exclusion of "ideas."
134. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a).
135. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a). See also Weinreb, supranote 8, at 1244.
136. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1244; Breyer, supra note 10, at 324; see also 17
U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (stating that the length of protection is life plus fifty). Many copyright
followers anticipate the "life plus fifty" rule will soon be expanded to "life plus seventyfive." See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1243-44.
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ates any increased incentive for authors to produce their works. 33
The value of most all copyrighted works is likely to be zero approximately seventy-five years from the time of their generation,
and even if some works are still earning money for the author's
heirs, the present value of that income stream at the time of creation is practically nonexistent and unlikely to encourage the generation of information. Nevertheless, despite Breyer's recommendation that the term of copyright not be expanded,'38 Congress did
just that in the Copyright Act of 1976."39 Weinreb further laments
the constantly increasing scope of the copyright monopoly, as he
argues that the ease with which copyright has been extended
threatens others' use of the very avenues of communication necessary for expression in our society. Needless to say, under a government-run reward system where copying was freely allowed
once an item of information was generated and rewarded, this
problem of the expansion of the duration of monopoly rights would
not be an issue.
Finally, while the award of property rights in information reduces the amount of effort by rivals to copy works (and by authors
to prevent copying), it is still not totally optimal. Breyer raises the
point that abolishing copyright altogether would eliminate the
transaction costs involved in obtaining permission to reproduce an
author's work.' 41 In addition, any enforcement costs necessary to
protect against violations of rights in copyright, and patent as well,
would be saved in a government-run reward system.
Hence, it is evident that there are some serious shortcomings
produced by the award of exclusive property rights in information

137. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1244.
138. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 350 (In 1970, Breyer went as far as to say that
"[t]he period of copyright protection is at present too long and should not be extended
beyond fifty-six years." A few years later, Congress ignored his warnings.)
139. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1010) (West Supp. 1999)).
140. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1219.
141. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 316. However, the copyright doctrine of fair use
mitigates the problem of obtaining permission in many cases. Parties are allowed to use
portions of copyrighted works without requesting permission or paying royalties when
the amount taken is not very large, and where their use is unlikely to adversely affect the
copyright holder's market for her work. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
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to their creators. It behooves society to take a careful look at those
negative effects, and to consider fairly the benefits of an alternative
reward system. Even if such a policy is deemed infeasible or otherwise not adopted, the lessons we can draw from the pitfalls of
existing property rights in information versus the virtues of a reward regime are highly applicable to the future development of
intellectual property law in this country.
B. The Government-Run Reward System
1. Theory
Contrary to the monopoly price and restricted use dilemmas
created by current intellectual property rights, a publicly funded
reward system seeks to maximize overall social welfare by retaining incentives to create while simultaneously optimizing the dissemination of information. The theory runs as follows: society
pays innovators from the public purse for the generation of socially
valuable information. Valuation of the reward poses a difficulty,
but scholars such as Shavell and Polanvyi propose avenues to mitigate the problem. 4 ' Once the award is given, the innovation falls
into the public domain such that it can be reproduced without penalty and distributed to all those whose willingness to pay is equal
to or exceeds the marginal cost of production. As noted previously, this cost is often far below market prices witnessed today,'43
and the hope and goal is that the large number of potential consumers who were previously "priced out" by the monopoly rent
will now be able to enjoy the good. In this manner, overall social
welfare is increased: firms possess the same or greater incentives
to innovate because the rewards they receive will be largely based
upon volume of use, which should be greater than current use in
almost all cases. Further, the socially optimal amount of consumption is attained since the work is disseminated at marginal
cost. Hence, as long as the reward is set to reflect the social value
142. See Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 68; SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note
19, § 7.1.19. See also Part II.B.4.
143. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 390-91 (noting how Pfizer's production cost of
tetracycline was less than one-tenth of the price for which the drug was sold commercially).
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of the information, society will be better off under this government
sponsored regime than under our current intellectual property
rights system.
2. Financing Rewards through Taxes
Of course, rewards do not grow on trees. The government
must use its power of-general taxation to raise the necessary funds,
and that implicates any and all of the costs and inefficiencies associated with the tax system. Most notably with respect to an income
tax, there are the drawbacks of administrative costs and distorted
work incentives. Administrative costs, in the form of tax collection and payment systems, are not insubstantial. However, the
taxes required for reward payouts would not necessitate the construction of an entirely new taxation procedure. As such, it is unlikely that the current administrative costs of the tax system will
increase significantly, and they are almost certainly less than those
of the current legal/intellectual property system.' 44 Work incentives will be subject to some distortional effect if overall tax rates
rise, but that is probably far less of a problem than the distorted
purchasing decisions made today when the prices of informational
works grossly exceed marginal cost.
Moreover, Polanvyi forcefully asserts that the cost of additional taxes is easily paid for by reduced prices and the increased
likelihood of technological progress:
The fact that considerable sums of public money would be
required under the new system in order to pay rewards to
patentees cannot be held against it. The burden would be
manifestly offset, and far more than offset, by the benefits
accruing to the public in the form of cheaper prices for
patented articles and the general quickening of technical
progress due to the free general use of inventions coupled
with the advantages of releasing trade from various limita-

144. On a tangential topic, Kaplow and Shavell have written a provocative article
detailing why redistribution of income through taxes is always more efficient than the
legal system. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
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tions now imposed on it by monopolistic organizations.141
Thus, the advantages are not merely decreased price and
greater social use and utility. The reward system also would ideally enable the optimal generation of new innovations that depend
on those of the past because there would no longer be monopoly
rights standing in the way of subsequent development.
3. Who Will Prefer Rewards Over Intellectual Property
Rights?
Furthermore, despite the actual and administrative costs of
taxes, it is likely that people will virtually unanimously prefer
switching to a reward regime. Many individuals have made the
following arguments to me, "if I do not use a certain product that
the reward system requires taxes to pay for, then I am being taxed
unfairly" or "at least my utility will be lower compared to others."
Polanvyi responds by stating that the vast majority of individual
benefits and losses are evened out over time so that only with a
few marked exceptions would people's benefits not be approximately even.146 I would add that despite the "I don't use the product" criticism, there are countless examples of items for which we
all currently pay taxes to support that different individuals certainly do not utilize to the same extent, such as education, libraries, firemen, the military, etc.
More importantly, Shavell constructs a simple example to help
demonstrate that potentially all people would prefer a reward system to current intellectual property rights.'47 He suggests a good
whose cost of production is $4, and whose monopoly price under
patent is $10. Assuming that each consumer buys ten units of the
product, the monopolist's profit per person equals $60 (10 units x
$6/unit). Under a reward regime, we can assume that each individual now must pay an increase in their taxes of $60 to finance
the reward, and the price is reduced to $4 (the marginal cost of the
good). Since the price has decreased, intuitively consumers will
purchase more than ten units now, and still be better off. Why?
145. Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 69 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 65.
147. See SHAVELL, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE, supra note 11, § 7, at 11.
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Because they could still buy the same ten units as they did previously for $4 each, and wind up with a $100 total outlay (Simply
stated 10 units x $4/unit + $60 in taxes). 14' Thus, if they voluntarily choose to buy a greater number, let's say twelve units, it must
be that they make themselves better off than if they purchased ten.
Users of the good are better off because they are extracting the
consumer surplus that the prior monopoly price had prevented
them from attaining.
4. Valuing the Reward Amount
Some difficulties arise with respect to calculating the amount
of the reward to be paid to innovators. Proponents of the current
intellectual property system assert that its greatest benefit is its
ability to allow the market to sort out supply and demand, and the
compensation innovators receive is therefore simply based on how
much of the good is sold and at what price. John Stuart Mill favored the patent system over the reward system on this ground, arguing that the greater the usefulness of a product, the greater the
creator's income, and there is nothing remaining for society to figure Out. 149 However, while monopoly price and quantity will no
longer be available to calculate the amount of the reward, that does
not imply that the amount will be incalculable or even arbitrary.
Shavell offers that "the state might base the reward on the volume
of use of the information, such as the sales volume of a book, and
on some measure of its utility." 50 Both use and utility can be accounted for in a reward regime, and both factors will reflect socially optimal valuations rather than merely those of the individuals able to afford the monopoly price.
Polanvyi adds that the creation of a rigid (i.e., unbiased) valuation mechanism is crucial and quite attainable. "The return on
which [rewards] are based should include only data endorsable by
an accountants' certificate" in order to prevent claims of unfairness
or corruption. 5' He adds:
148. See id.
149. See Mill, supra note 18, at 933. Mill's critique of the arbitrariness of the reward system is discussed infra, Part II.D.2.
150. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, § 7.1.19.
151. Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 68.
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For inventions, dealing with the manufacture of known
products by improved methods, the economics achieved
could be established accurately enough without much trouble. In the case of entirely new commodities or services
made available through a new invention, data concerning
the commercial profitability of their production would be
required [to calculate the reward amount].' 5
Polanvyi submits however that only a fraction of an innovation's
total value need be paid to the inventor because "the total usefulness.., is bound to increase... by the proposed free accessibility
of inventions to all.' 53 Hence, to match creators' current earnings,
he estimates that only one-tenth to one-third of the assessed social
benefits of the patented inventions need be paid to the creator.'54 In
this manner, the reward regime dramatically increases the surplus
created for and retained by the consumers as opposed to the surplus witnessed in the copyright or patent system. Nevertheless,
while Polanvyi's assertions are theoretically justified, I view the
valuation aspect as a vulnerable area of the reward system to criticism by pragmatists."'

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Given Polanvyi's logic, it will almost certainly be the case that a fraction
of an innovation's social benefit can be paid to innovators while still preserving the same
incentive for individuals and firms to generate information. However, we should ask
whether increasing the reward beyond what innovators receive today under intellectual
property protection would not stimulate even more socially beneficial investment in innovation. Perhaps the amount of information developed today is too low given that use
(as measured by quantity sold) is artificially depressed by monopoly prices.
We should also keep in mind when establishing the reward amount the previous discussion of what types of information are particularly responsive to pecuniary rewards.
See supra Part I.C. Society would do best to set the reward to take into account whether
certain informational works are motivated by incentives other than money, or whether
financial inducement is necessary to creation.
155. Many intellectual property scholars have dismissed or criticized the reward
system as impractical based on potential valuation problems, including Patrick Croskery,
Institutional Utilitarianismand Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631, 638-40
(1993) (criticizing Polanvyi's proposed reward system); Breyer, supra note 10, at 307,
Tirole, supra note 66, at 401; and Scherer, supra note 5, at 398-99. See also Part II.D.2.
and D.3.
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5. Additional Benefits of the Reward SystemDependence of Future Innovations; Savings on
Enforcement Costs
Some additional benefits of the reward system should be detailed prior to a more thorough discussion of its actual use and potential flaws. As touched upon throughout this Article, a reward
scheme would allow innovations to enter immediately into the
public domain, thus expanding the scope of knowledge available to
help make future "dependent" innovations possible at an earlier
date. 15 6 On a related note, Polanvyi cites the "increased publicity of
technical research which the new [reward] system is bound to induce."' 57 By this, he means that under today's intellectual property
laws, inventors are reluctant to publish any of the knowledge
gained in their investigations prior to the point at which they formulate a patentable product.5 5 Because of statutory bars, novelty,
and nonobviousness rules in the Patent Act,'59 innovators fear that
publication of a result bearing on any technical subject may impair
or even destroy the chance of obtaining a patent on some future
useful application of it. 60 However, under a reward scheme, this
problem could be avoided completely assuming that rewards are
established16 for any published investigation that leads to a practical
invention.
Moreover, the reward regime would save on the legal, private,
and social enforcement costs involved in protecting property rights
from theft, infringement, or copying by others. While administering the reward system would have costs of its own, Shavell recognizes that "innovators would have no reason to prevent others from
156. See Besen and Raskind, supra note 99, at 5; Machlup and Penrose, supra note
121, at 24.
157. Polanvyi, supranote 20, at 75.

158. See id.
159. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376) (1994)).
160. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(b), and 103. The statutory bar provision
(§ 102(b)) states that in order to obtain a patent, the invention must not have been patented
or described in a printed publication in the United States or abroad more than one year
prior to the date of application for patent in the United States.
161. See Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 75.
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copying their work, and those who wanted
to copy would not have
162
to overcome obstacles to so doing.,
Hence, the advantages of a public rewards system are not limited to achieving a perfectly competitive price and optimal dissemination of information, but also include increased innovation
activity and the elimination of the social costs involved in enforcing property rights.
C. Actual Use of the Reward System
Furthermore, the benefits of a reward scheme are not merely
theoretical or based on untested assumptions as some skeptics suggest. The reward system has been utilized with respect to various
types of information generation in the United States, Europe, and
the former Soviet Union. In addition, practices analogous to rewards, such as government prizes, subsidization, or funding of innovators, are quite commonplace indeed.
In the United States, the reward system is employed in the
arena of atomic energy' inventions.'63 The United States Atomic
Energy Act of 19 4 6 64 created a Patent Compensation Board whose
role it was to bestow financial awards upon individuals who devised innovations involving military uses of atomic energy. 165 Under the law, inventors were understandably denied exclusive patent
rights to innovations of such great public consequence and danger.
In the former Soviet Union, the reward method was also a standard
approach used to encourage the generation of information by its
citizens. Inventors could apply for "certificates of authorship," and
if their certified invention found an industrial application, the
creator would be entitled to a portion of the cost savings during its
early years of use. 16 6 The award was determined by formula, with

162. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, § 7.1.20(c).
163. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Patent Protection and Atomic Energy Legislation, 46
CAL. L. REV. 40 (1958).
164. Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20112297g (1994)).
165. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 398.
166. See Francis Hughes, Soviet Invention Awards, ECON. J. 291-97 (1945); S. Stepanov, Increasing the Role of Innovators and Inventors in Improving Socialist Production, 1 PROBLEMS OF ECON. 75-78 (1958); Scherer, supra note 5, at 358.
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the inventor's share falling to two percent of the marginal savings
in the highest tax bracket.' 67
In Europe, though the reward system was never formally
adopted, it appeared for many years that the trend of the law was
moving the continent to such a system over that of patent. Shavell
notes that "in England a succession of Parliamentary committees
and royal commissions were appointed to examine the patent system and propose reforms or alternatives."' 6 In addition, in 1869,
The Economist proclaimed that "[i]t is probable enough that the
patent laws will be abolished ere long . ... ,,169 However, for various reasons, more political than intellectual, the patent system won
out and talk of rewards subsided.7
Nevertheless, a variety of practices similar to the reward system have emerged and continue to be utilized, especially in the
United States. Despite Breyer's mostly unsubstantiated dismissal
of a reward scheme as impractical, he concedes that "a more equitable distribution. . . [which] will widen the dissemination of serious works, can be devised without great difficulty in the form of
subsidies, grants, or prizes from the government.''
He acknowledges the practicality of these measures, citing to the fact that
many governments and institutions do in fact offer such awards.
"In the United States the amount of such support is large when
compared with the total revenue that scholarly, technical, or scientific writers receive from copyright royalties, and even in the case
of literary works it is significant.' 72
Scherer' s research confirms the extent of this public investment, as he found that the federal government already supplies
monetary support for greater than fifty percent of all United States
research and development activity.'. Most of this funding is for
military pursuits, but approximately one-fifth of federal expenditures are directed towards civilian areas such as agriculture, food
167. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 358.
168. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at § 7.1.21.
169. See Machiup and Penrose, supra note 121, at 1 n.3.
170. See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, § 7.1.21.
171. Breyer, supra note 10, at 287.
172. Id.
173. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 398.
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products, aviation, and ,health and medical technologies. 74 It is
also worth noting that with respect to state support of basic research, the researchers usually do not obtain property rights in their
findings. This makes a good deal of common sense, for the resulting information is often not useful in and of itself, but rather is
often used in combination with other knowledge to enhance available information and/or produce tangible 'goods down the road. 17'
Despite the reality and extent of government sponsored prizes and
research expenditures however, Scherer is wary that a federal research and development allocation system might "overlook[]
promising new opportunities" and "neglect[] unknown young men
at the peak of their creative powers."' 176 However, if rewards are
based on their eventual social use and utility, the "unknown" will
get their due once consumers have their say.
Thus, given the history of state support of research and bestowal of prizes and/or actual rewards, there is more than a mere
theoretical basis for the introduction of a reward system as an alternative to intellectual property rights in the United States.
D. Criticisms and Responses of the Reward System
Nevertheless, criticism of a government-run reward system is
not uncommon in intellectual property rights literature. 177 While
most of it takes the form of vague and unsupported notions regarding the impracticality of such an idea, I Will focus my attention
on the critiques based upon more substantiated concerns.
1. The Government Would not be Able to Finance the
Rewards
Many skeptics immediately question the ability of the government to raise the necessary funds to support a reward system.
Robert Frase emphatically doubted that it was conceivable that the
"vast increases in the sums now available for this purpose" could

174. See id.
175. See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, § 7.1.22.
176. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 398.
177. See, e.g., "IROLE, supra note 66, at 401; Scherer, supra note 5, at 398-99;
Breyer, supra note 10, at 307, Mill, supranote 18, at 932. '
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be assembled to enable payments to creators.'7 8 Intellectual property attorney Batur Oktay offered a similar view: "Is the government going to pay a company billions of dollars in potential
worldwide distribution revenue? I think not, or our country would
swiftly go bankrupt."' 7 9
While these concerns are intuitively understandable, they do
not hold up to economic scrutiny. The, sums required to finance
rewards will be large, but the government can use its power of
taxation to meet the demand. 8° While such an action alone would
encounter a great deal of political resistance, that should not be the
case when it is accompanied by the corresponding decrease in
prices of virtually all goods which currently enjoy intellectual
property protection. Shavell's example, detailed above,18 ' illustrates that even after an individual's 'taxes increase to supply the
funds necessary for a reward, she is still better off once decreased
price and increased use is factored into the equation. 82 Dissemination of information is bound to rise dramatically due to the elimination of monopoly prices. Polanvyi thus argues that "it may not
be necessary to pay to patentees more than one-third the assessed
benefits of the patented invention" in order to equal the monetary
reward they are currently obtaining. 3 The expansion of overall
social surplus created by the growth in volume of use under a reward system (compared to one which grants exclusive property
rights) will vastly offset the increase in taxes.
Still though, taxes possess separate costs in and of themselves-administrative costs and distorted work incentives. 184 As
noted previously, administrative expenses for tax collection and

178. See Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 11, at 436-37 (Frase's commentary is included in the discussion following the Hurt and Schuchman article.)
179. E-mail from Batur Oktay, Intellectual Property Associate, Foster Pepper &
Shefelman, to Steve Calandrillo, Oct. 20, 1997 (on file with the author).
180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 811] ("The Congress shall have the Power to Lay and
Collect Taxes ...").
181. See supra Part II.B.3.
182. See SHAVELL, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE, supra note 19, at § 7, at 11.
183. Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 68. In fact, he suggests one-tenth to one-third of
the assessed social benefits would be sufficient to induce the same amount of innovation
witnessed today under intellectual property laws.
184. See supra Part II.B.2.
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payment systems can be significant. However, the reward system
will not require the creation of a new tax system, and it is therefore
unlikely that current administrative costs will increase markedly.
Further, they are almost certainly less than those of the current legal and intellectual property system."5 While work incentives will
be distorted somewhat by a tax hike, that is probably less of a
problem than the distorted purchasing decisions made currently
when the prices of informational works greatly exceed their marginal cost.
2. The Government Would Not be able to Fairly Value
the Rewards
A more challenging critique for a reward system to answer is
that of how valuation would operate. John Stuart Mill thought the
problem to be serious, arguing that "an exclusive privilege.., is
preferable [to a reward system] because it leaves nothing to anyone's discretion."'86 Essentially, Mill was concerned that rewards
will somehow be arbitrary, uncertain, or not based upon the usefulness of the information. In turn, this could have a chilling effect
on the amount of risk bearing undertaken by innovators. Scherer
raises further worries regarding the government's ability to value
works accurately. He states that "any bureaucratic council entrusted with the job is bound to make mistakes and perpetuate inequities."' 817 Additionally, he believes that conservative bias may
inevitably creep into calculations of rewards, arguing that
"[m]unificence is a rare committee virtue. ' ' 8
185. As noted in Part II.B.2, Kaplow and Shavell have written a provocative article
detailing why redistribution of income through taxes is always more efficient than the
legal system. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 144.
186. Mill, supra note 18, at 933.
187. Scherer, supra note 5, at 398.
188. Id. at 399. Scherer points to examples where the Atomic Energy Commission's Patent Compensation Board paid grossly low amounts as rewards for inventions.
For instance, the Board gave $1 million as compensation for Robert H. Goddard's basic
liquid rocket engine patents, even though subsequent U.S. expenditures on liquidpropelled rockets amounted to approximately $10 billion. While this might at first shock
the conscience and militate against a government-run reward system, it is important to
consider that the Board paid the $1 million compensation before it knew the extent of
future utilization of the information. This problem can easily be remedied by allowing
rewards to be updated based on continued and future use of the informational work.
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However, objective measures of determining rewards are available and urged by all supporters of the system. Polanvyi quickly
states that "[i]n order to avoid the danger of corruption and arbitrary oppression..., the whole procedure should be made fairly
rigid. The return on which [rewards] are based should include only
data endorsable by accountants' certificate."189 In this manner,
"rewards to inventors may be expected to be not less but much
more fair under the proposed new system than they are to-day."' 90
Shavell adds that the amount awarded could be based on volume of
use of the information and on some measure of utility. 9' Assuming dissemination of information increases to the point of social
optimality, and the reward is largely based upon the volume of use,
criteria of "the greater the usefulness, the
that should meet Mill's
92
reward."'
the
greater
While calculating use should be objective and easily verifiable,
estimating utility still remains a difficulty. Shavell acknowledges
this, and suggests that we could help ensure a modicum of fairness
by establishing committees insulated from the political process and
by having legal oversight of the reward process.' 93 Nevertheless,
ascertaining utility will present a problem to some degree, and is
most likely the reason that when Europe debated implementing the
reward system in the nineteenth century, it was considered only for
patented products, since the value and utility of copyrighted works
is inherently more subjective.

Thus, it is not a problem of conservative bias that Scherer is pointing out, but rather one
of retroactive perspective that an improved reward system can take into account. But cf.
TiROLE, supra note 66, at 401.
189. Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 68.
190. Id. at 75.
191. See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, § 7.1.19.
192. Mill, supra note 18, at 933.
193. See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, § 7, at 5-6.
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3. The Government Might Possess Worse Information
About the Nature of Demand for Products than Firms
Do
In addition to Mill's concern that the reward system might
prove arbitrary, he contended that unlike rewards, patents were superior "before because the reward conferred by [them] depends
upon the invention's being found useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward."' 94 Implicit in this argument is the
criticism that the government will suffer from information problems in estimating the nature of demand and utility for products in
calculating rewards. The patent system, on the other hand, naturally incorporates firms' specialized knowledge regarding the demand and utility of a good. For instance, if the government has
less information about the potential utility of a good than a firm
has, even an objective volume of use measure used to value the
rewards might not capture the true social value of the innovation.
A brief example helps to illuminate the problem: Suppose a
firm knows that a drug it is considering developing will give future
users a dramatically large amount of utility, though the total pool
of such users will be relatively small (i.e., AIDS patients). If the
government bases its reward on the volume of use and underestimates the utility each consumer derives, it will not provide correct
incentives for the firm to develop the drug in the first place, leading to less than socially optimal generation of information. However, if a firm knows that it will be granted a patent monopoly, it
can be assured of reaping the benefits of its specialized and more
accurate knowledge than that which the government possesses.
Thus, when use is low but extremely or deceptively valuable, the
patent system may be better than rewards in structuring correct incentives to generate information because it naturally harnesses
firms' information regarding demand.
Tirole agrees with this point, arguing that under the reward
system, the "government must be highly knowledgeable about the
feasibility of various inventions and the demand for them. Information about demand is crucial for determining the size of the
194. Mill, supra note 18, at 933.
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award, which, in turn, influences the research incentives."' 95 He
believes that firms are generally better informed than the government on these issues, and therefore a less centralized alternative
than a government reward system would be preferable.196 Croskery
adds support, stating simply that the government would face "a
significant problem gathering accurate data."' 97
These points are well taken and present a real dilemma. However, Polanvyi suggests that information obstacles might not be as
insurmountable as Mill, Tirole, and Croskery fear.'98 Sellers and
licensees will be able to provide necessary information on the volume of sales to consumers. Shavell similarly cites the utilization
of sales volume and the creation of independent committees to get
at objective measures of use and utility of goods. 99 Furthermore,
Polanvyi urges that the economies achieved by inventions that improve methods of manufacturing known products could be established accurately with current statistical techniques" 0 And in the
case of entirely new inventions, Polanvyi believes data concerning
the commercial profitability of their production could be obtained."'
Still, both Tirole and Croskery may be correct in their conclusions that the reward system will not gather information about
value as effectively as the market and current intellectual property
rights would 22 Shavell and Ypersele acknowledge this possibility
as well, and suggest implementing an optional reward system
which leaves the decision of whether to seek a government reward,
or traditional intellectual property rights, with the innovator herself.2 3 Such a system unambiguously dominates current intellec-

195. TIROLE, supra note 66, at 401.
196. Id.
197. Croskery, supra note 155, at 639.
198. See Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 67-68; TIROLE, supra note 65 at 401; Mill, supra note 18 at 932.
199. See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, § 7.1.19.
200. See Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 68. But cf.Croskery, supra note 155, at 639.
Croskery believes that such statistical techniques are notoriously difficult, for it is almost
impossible to control for all relevant factors. See id.
201. See Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 68.
202. See Croskery, supra note 155, at 641; TIROLE, supranote 66, at 401.
203. See Shavell & Ypersele, supranote 22, at 7.
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tual property laws which offer no such election. If the creator
chooses intellectual property protection, both she and society attain
exactly the same level of welfare as in today's mandatory intellectual property system. However, if the innovator opts instead for a
government reward, her welfare must be improved vis-A-vis obtaining an intellectual property right (assuming she is a rational
actor making rational decisions). Likewise, social welfare is enhanced because the deadweight loss from monopoly intellectual
property rights is avoided. Thus, both innovators and society will
be at least as well or better off operating under an optional reward
system than under our current regime.
Moreover, the efficiency loss created by any government information deficiencies regarding the nature of demand is likely to
decrease as better and substitute measures of use and utility
emerge. The question then is whether such a loss is substantial
enough so that the costs of valuing rewards would outweigh their
sizable benefits. As stated throughout, I do not believe that to be
the case.
4. The Rewards will not be Given to the Correct Person
Furthermore, Mill feared that compensation might go to the
wrong people under a reward system, whereas the patent regime
guaranteed that the patentee would be the one to receive the recompense for her innovation. °4 However, Machlup and Penrose observed that Mill's argument was "flatly contradicted by a large
number of authorities, including Lord Stanley, the chairman of the
royal commission that inquired into the patent system in 18631865. "25 Upon conducting his analysis, Lord Stanley reversed his
previously favorable views on the patent system, concluding that it
was nearly impossible for rewards to go to deserving parties.0 6
Presumably, this is due to the fact that innovators are often in the
employ of another (venture capitalists for instance) and therefore
patent rights are assigned not to the intellectual force behind the
creation but the financial one instead. Moreover, contrary to Mill's

204. See Mill, supra note 18, at 932-33.
205. Machlup and Penrose, supra note 121, at 20.
206. See id.
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assertions, Lord Stanley found that it was impossible for rewards
under patent to be based on usefulness, and that great injury was
frequently inflicted upon others.0 7
5. Rewards will only be Given to Inventions in the
Narrow Sense
An additional concern held by Scherer is that the definition of
an invention or innovation would be too limited in a governmentrun reward system. He bemoans that rewards will only be given
"to inventions in the narrow sense," and will not compensate "innovative contributions."20 8 However, Polanvyi argues that exactly
the opposite is the case. He urges that the reward system will
stimulate publicity of technical research (and hence invention) precisely because of the "establishment of adequate rewards for any
published investigations which.., lead to practical inventions."20 9
He argues that under the current intellectual property system, such
disclosures (which would certainly not qualify as "inventions in
the narrow sense") and subsequent innovations are retarded.
Many inventors are fearful that any release of information prior to
its extensive development will threaten their ability to obtain a patent on some future useful application of it."' ° A reward system
would remedy this problem by compensating innovators for partially developed information that would not qualify under a narrow
definition of invention.
6. A Government-Run Reward System would Threaten
Literary Independence
Several critics have raised concerns that a government-run reward system would pose a danger to the generation of information
that might be viewed by others as undesirable. Macauley, having
disparaged copyright as a monopoly, and therefore evil, defended
it as less repugnant than a patronage/reward system. He felt the
reward scheme would be "fatal to the integrity and independence

207.
208.
209.
210.

See id.
Scherer, supra note 5, at 398.
Polanvyi, supranote 20, at 75.
See id.
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of literary men" and "certain to turn those minds which are formed
by nature to be the blessings and ornaments of our species into
public scandals and pests." '' Similarly, Frase warned that direct
payments from the government to reward creative efforts would
"deprive authors of their principal means of maintaining financial,
and therefore literary independence. It would take us back to the
days when wealthy patrons and state subsidies could determine literary content rather than leaving content to the test of the market
place."2 2' Professor Breyer joined the fray in more muted tones,
arguing that "increased reliance upon the government for financing
23
book production increases the risk of censorship.""
While it is conceivable that political and moral viewpoints
might sometimes intrude on rewards given out, it is unlikely that
the problem is as grave as the above scholars contend. Despite his
colleagues' stinging criticisms, Weinreb indicates that the record
regarding public support of creative effort in this country, though
not perfect, is contrary to Macauley's, Frase's, and Breyer's assessments. Weinreb states, "the diversity of the funding sources
[of public monetary rewards] is a strong defense against cultural
hegemony. Indeed the usual assumption is that we depend on just
such sources of support to protect the arts against the hegemony of
the market. 21 4 Even with respect to rewards financed solely by the
government, there are safeguards against significant political influence upon the independence of innovators. For instance, using
formulas based upon sales and use volume to determine rewards
removes the calculation from the realm of morality." 5 Likewise,
Polanvyi seeks to "avoid the danger of corruption and arbitrary oppression which is never far removed from the grant of Government
subsidies [by making] the whole procedure of their assessment ...
fairly rigid," (i.e., based only on data certifiable by accountants)."'
Additionally, independent and politically-insulated committees
could be established to aid in the valuation effort."' Though there
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1236.
Frase, in Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 11, at 437.
Breyer, supra note 10, at 308.
Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1233-34 (footnote omitted).
See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 19, § 7.1.19.
Polanvyi, supra note 20, at 68.
See SHAVELL, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE, supra note 11, § 7, at 5-6.
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may not be a utopian solution, given the above safeguards and the
current American political climate, the problem is certainly not
nearly as grave as it might have been under European monarchies
of previous centuries.
7. A Reward System would not Solve the Race to be First
As noted above, a government-run reward system will not
solve the race to be the first party to generate a given piece of information in order to obtain the reward for it.218 This often leads to
wasted duplicative, premature, and excessive investment. This dilemma adheres to the current intellectual property rights regime as
well as to a reward system. While it cannot easily be remedied,
Kitch's discussion of the patent system implies that the negative
effects of socially wasteful duplicative effort can be mitigated if
property rights (or rewards) are bestowed relatively early on in the
process so as to shorten the period of simultaneous investment by
multiple parties.219 Once the vital aspects of the informational
work are deduced so that only the refinement of the product remains, the innovator should be recognized and given the reward
rights to the social value she creates.
Moreover, a government-run reward regime does offer one advantage over current intellectual property laws in this area. In the
case of an individual who creates a socially useful work but is slow
or uninterested in developing it further, other parties similarly situated will retain incentives to build off of it since no monopoly
rights preventing duplication or further improvement would be bestowed on the first party. Thus, the race to be first would not prevent others from taking over the baton.'
8. How Would the Reward System Operate
Internationally?
Though the international ramifications of the reward system
proposal have not received much attention at all in intellectual
property literature, it is an area that presents some questions.
There are two prongs to the dilemma: (1) how to deal with works
218. See supra Part II.A.2.
219. See Kitch, supra note 17, at 278-79.
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given rewards in the United States when they get transported
abroad, and (2) how to deal with works copyrighted or patented
abroad when they are brought into the United States.
With respect to the first issue, we would not be able to easily
take into account foreign use of information generated in America
in order to increase the amount of the reward paid out (although
this would be socially ideal to encourage the correct level of innovation). This is due simply to the fact that the United States government would have no simple way of collecting taxes from foreign citizens to finance rewards based on foreigners' use of
products originating here. Hence, if foreign cooperation is impractical, the best solution would simply be to award American innovators property rights with respect to the out-of-the-country use
of their creation. There is such reciprocity of intellectual property
rights laws today, and there is no reason to think it would not continue.
With respect to the second issue of the treatment of works here
that originated abroad, we have two choices. We could either treat
the work the same as we do currently (i.e., protect it with the reciprocal intellectual property rights that exist between most democratic nations) or we could take the innovation and place it in the
public domain in the United States. The Chinese are notorious for
taking works that originate abroad and placing them in the public
domain. 220 As might be imagined, this practice has not endeared
them to the rest of the global community, but only because no
compensation to the innovator is given. If the United States were
to try the public domain approach, presumably we would offer rewards to foreign creators based on some measure of the volume of
use and utility of their goods, which would preserve the correct incentives to innovate for the American market. Thus, foreign innovators would now receive whatever intellectual property protection
their home country bestows, plus rewards for the social value they
create in the United States.

220. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1236.
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IH. FINAL ANALYSIS

Despite the aforementioned wrinkles posed by the governmentrun reward system, the benefits and intuition behind it are compelling. In contrast, the traditionally accepted justifications for exclusive property rights in information are not all that strong when
subjected to economic analysis. The goal of intellectual property
law makes perfect common sense at first: by awarding property
rights to protect an author's work from theft or duplication, incentives are thereby provided for innovators to invest in and create
their works since they are assured of reaping the fruits of their efforts. Precisely because this makes such "obvious" sense, property
rights in information have largely been taken for granted and are
rarely seriously questioned today. 2 ' This contentment is folly, for
it ignores the problems created by exclusive rights, the alternative
incentives available to generate information, and the possibilities
and benefits of a government-run reward system.
First, the monopoly rights bestowed by copyright and patent,
though temporary, often have significant negative effects on social
welfare. To summarize, though the promise of exclusive rights encourages investment in innovation, it also results in market prices
22
that frequently exceed the cost of production by a large margin.
While some of the mark-up goes to offset the development expenses, a far from insignificant portion is precisely due to the government-awarded monopoly power over price and quantity. The
inflation of price over that which would be witnessed in a competitive market necessarily leads to restriction of use, and therefore
less than socially optimal dissemination of information. As prices
in some industries vastly exceed marginal cost, the net social (or
deadweight) loss can become quite substantial, evidenced best in
the pharmaceutical and software markets.223
Furthermore, even in the absence of explicit legal protection,
intellectual property scholars have made persuasive arguments that
for some types of informational works, alternative incentives exist
221. See id. at 1153.
222. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 391.
223. See id.
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to induce creation besides the promise of monopoly rights. For instance, the quest for personal satisfaction, respect, and esteem are
often significant motivating forces behind creation."' In addition,
"first movers" have leverage and incentives beyond property rights
when it comes to generating a particular piece of information.225
Likewise, some experts have acknowledged the power of convention in mitigating the negative effects that would arise in the absence of intellectual property protection.226 It is important that we
take these lessons learned and apply them in setting awards in a
reward regime so as to maximize amounts paid out for those types
of works that are particularly dependent on pecuniary inducements
as opposed to other factors.
Given the above backdrop, the government-run reward system
seeks to preserve the financial incentives available under intellectual property laws to generate information while eliminating the
drawbacks. By offering a monetary reward instead of property
rights for the development of socially useful information, incentives to invest in creation are maintained. However, only now will
dissemination of information become optimal since works fall into
the public domain once they are rewarded. Thus, they can be
freely copied and reproduced by others, ideally enabling them to
be sold to the public at the cost of production. Under the reward
system, many more consumers can benefit from the information,
i.e., all those who were previously "priced out" because their reservation price lay between marginal cost and monopoly price. Innovators can also freely use previously developed information as
soon as it is released in order to develop subsequent innovations
(as opposed to waiting for patents or copyrights to expire). Hence,
as long as rewards are set to reflect the social value of information,
optimal production and distribution will be achieved.
There are many criticisms of such a reward regime however,
based upon vague notions of impracticality and concerns about
valuation and creative independence. Those worries can largely be
remedied though by objective formulas based on volume of use of
224. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1226, 1233, 1235.
225. See Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 11, at 421-32; Breyer, supra note 10, at
299-302; Scherer, supra note 5, at 384-85.
226. See Weinreb, supra note 8, at 1236-7.
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the information, and the establishment of independent boards isolated from political intrusions. The most significant criticism centers on the possibility that the government might suffer from information deficiences in evaluating the demand for products, but
this reality might be mitigated by an optional reward system and
does not outweigh the substantial benefits of rewards.
On balance then, the reward system is more compelling than
our current intellectual property regime. It realistically offers the
potential to achieve optimal innovation and dissemination of information without the primary drawbacks created by monopoly
rights. The reward regime far better enables access of lower income individuals to highly useful goods by reducing their prices to
marginal cost. Even if rewards in practice are less utopian than I
have theorized, they still will more closely approximate the social
optimum than exclusive rights do by eliminating the dead weight
losses associated with exclusive rights." 7 Hence, if we could
transport ourselves through history to the time when American intellectual property rights were first debated and formulated, I
would argue vociferously for the introduction of rewards instead.
However, we are not starting from scratch. Rather, we live in a
country and a time in which exclusive property rights are the unquestioned norm; anything less is considered a threat to our social
mores. Copyright and patent laws have become deeply entrenched
in our nation's collective conscience by hundreds of years worth of
practice and experience. There is great comfort and certainty in
keeping what we know, and turning such a system on its head
would surely have negative consequences. A lack of social acceptance would threaten the feasibility of government rewards
from the outset, although I certainly would not say that such skepticism could not be overcome by time and reason. Still though, I
take very seriously Machlup's conclusion and warning to us. He
cautiously opined: "[i]f we did not have a patent system, it would
be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsi227. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 391. (Scherer discusses Pfizer Corporation's monopoly pricing practices, implicitly raising concern about deadweight losses created by
pricing above marginal cost due to patent protection.)
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ble... to recommend abolishing it. 28
Nevertheless, Machlup observed that his conclusion did not
preempt judgment concerning proposed changes within the system.
He, Weinreb, and I are especially skeptical of any proposal that
would extend intellectual property rights beyond their present
scope.229 Similarly, it would be wise to consider reductions of current monopoly protections if abandonment of those rights proves
not to be a viable alternative. In this way, even if the reward system is not implemented in America, we can draw great lessons
from our knowledge of its virtues. Specifically, leading scholars
such as Breyer and Weinreb have urged an end to the seemingly
constant expansion of the duration of copyright protection.230 Extending the life of copyright to seventy-five years after the death of
the author, from its present fifty years, has little economic
grounding, and only prevents works from falling into the public
domain for that much longer. Breyer expressed such notions over
twenty-five years ago, urging that the period of copyright protection is "too long and should not be extended beyond [the then standard] fifty-six years."23' Weinreb goes further, opining that our
unquestioning allowance of new subject matter into copyright
protection, such as derivative works that differ significantly from
the original, must cease.232 We should not institute new areas of
intellectual property coverage based upon the "bare assertion of
need" by an interested party, but rather only after a justified, demonstrated need for such protection has been shown. 33 I am not
highly optimistic that this will be the case though, as Breyer's entreaties to prevent the expansion of coverage to computer programs, for instance, went mostly unnoticed.3
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CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, if America were starting anew, a government-run reward system would best serve society's pursuit of optimal development and distribution of information, If the reward
system's virtues are never to be realized by us, it will certainly not
be because they are less intellectually compelling than those of our
current intellectual property system. As America goes forward
into the twenty-first century, at the very least, we should take a
close look at the warnings of scholars in the field as to the drawbacks of exclusive property rights in information. If a reward regime never gains acceptance, we must strive to ensure that the lessons learned from its discussion can be applied to make our current
laws achieve more closely the ideal of socially optimal innovation
and dissemination of information.
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APPENDIX
DEADWEIGHT

Loss DIAGRAM

The "Deadweight Loss" ("DWL") in a monopoly setting, as
Posner discusses, may be illustrated as follows:

Supply = Marginal
Cost

Price
P Monop.
P Compet.

Demand
Q Monop.

Q Compet.

Quantity

The Deadweight Loss ("DWL") is represented by the triangle
marked ABC. In this area, consumers would be willing to pay
more than what it costs for the firm to produce the good, but the
monopolist prevents this trade from occurring.

